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The second law of thermodynamics is traditionally interpreted as a coarse-grained result of clas-
sical mechanics. Recently its relation with quantum mechanical processes such as decoherence and
measurement has been revealed in literature. In this paper we will formulate the second law and
the associated time irreversibility following Everett’s idea: systems entangled with an object getting
to know the branch in which they live. Accounting for this self-locating knowledge, we get two
forms of entropy: objective entropy measuring the uncertainty of the state of the object alone, and
subjective entropy measuring the information carried by the self-locating knowledge. By showing
that the summation of the two forms of entropy is a conserved and perspective-free quantity, we
interpret the second law as a statement of irreversibility in knowledge acquisition. This essentially
derives the thermodynamic arrow of time from the subjective arrow of time, and provides a unified
explanation for varieties of the second law, as well as the past hypothesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The second law of thermodynamics is traditionally
derived from the classical phase-space trajectory de-
scribed by the Liouville equation [1, 2]: the state of
an isolated system tends to move towards coarse-grained
macrostates with larger numbers of microscopic degrees
of freedom [3]. This derivation of the second law, how-
ever, relies on the asymmetry of boundary conditions,
for the underlying microscopic laws of physics are com-
pletely reversible. To explain the ubiquitous validity of
the second law, one has to resort to the cosmological ini-
tial condition: a low-entropy universe at the beginning of
time [4, 5]. This is, however, an ad hoc assumption (the
past hypothesis) that is hard to further explain [6].
A different puzzle in modern physics is the quantum-
mechanical measurement problem. When one measures
a single superposed state, it randomly collapses to states
with different outcomes. All we can predict are the prob-
abilities of these outcomes. There is a long-lasting argu-
ment about the nature of this quantum state reduction
(QSR). As Tegmark pointed out in [7], if QSR is a phys-
ical process, then it would unavoidably increase entropy
over time. Given the current state of the universe, this
suggests an initial state with even lower entropy. As a
result, the situation of the past hypothesis can only get
worse.
If instead we regard QSR as only apparent, and as-
sume unitarity of the entire universe, then the funda-
mental laws of physics can be formulated with complete
simplicity. This is the approach suggested by Everett
decades ago [8]. He proposed that our experience is lim-
ited in the sense that we could only perceive a branch of
the entire reality. When opening the box that contains
Schrödinger’s cat, the observer is entangled with the cat
and its environment. This results in apparent branch-
ing such that the observer in different branches perceives
different states of the cat.
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The essence of Everett’s idea is threefold. First, the
“world” we perceive is in fact only a “branch” of the
entire reality. We will therefore define entire reality as
“global reality”, and reality in a specific branch as “lo-
cal reality”. Accordingly, we could also talk about global
state and local state of an object. Note that in this pa-
per the terms global and local are used specifically for
quantum-mechanical branching, and have nothing to do
with physical spacing. Secondly, there is nothing fun-
damentally different between the subject (the observer)
and the object (the observed). This is in contrast to the
von Neumann-Wigner interpretation, which claims that
the consciousness of the observer is essential to QSR [9].
Thirdly, the complete information of an object is not only
encoded in itself, but also in the systems with which it
interacts. From the perspective of these systems, what
really matters are the local states of the object in their
own branches.
As an example, consider a simplified scenario where an
observer and an electron are entangled in a global state:
(|↑〉 ⊗ |perceiving ↑〉+ |↓〉 ⊗ |perceiving ↓〉)/
√
2 . (1)
Note that this global state is for the composite system
consisting of both the object (i.e. the electron) and the
observer. The global state of the object alone can only
be described by a density matrix (|↑〉〈↑| + |↓〉〈↓|)/2. It
represents a statistical ensemble, because some of the in-
formation is encoded in the entanglement between the
object and the observer. Ignoring such information by
excluding the observer makes it an incomplete descrip-
tion of the object. But even knowing the global state
of the whole composite system, Eq. 1, is still incomplete
from the observer’s perspective.
The missing part is knowing in which branch the ob-
server actually lives. This is called “self-locating knowl-
edge”. Without such knowledge, the observer cannot
possibly know the local state from her own perspective.
Suppose the observer is deprived of the ability of per-
ception, and so might ask, “Between the two branches
where I should perceive ↑ or ↓, in which one do I actually
live?”. This self-locating uncertainty is then cleared after
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perception returns. The observer forms the self-locating
knowledge, “I am actually living in the branch in which
I perceive ↑ !”. Now she is certain about the object state
being a pure state | ↑〉〈↑ | rather than the mixed state
(| ↑〉〈↑ | + | ↓〉〈↓ |)/2. The former state, namely the lo-
cal state of the object, represents the local reality in her
own branch, which is all that matters from the observer’s
perspective. Accordingly, we can translate concepts of
the standard formulation of quantum mechanics to con-
cepts related to the self location of the observer: “inde-
terminism” to “self-locating uncertainty”, “probability”
to “self-locating probability”, and “collapse” to “acqui-
sition of self-locating knowledge”. This provides rooms
for these concepts under Everettian quantum mechanics
[10–14].
In the example above, the observer reduces the global
state of the object, (|↑〉〈↑|+|↓〉〈↓|)/2, to the local state in
her own branch, |↑〉〈↑|, by making use of her self-locating
knowledge. We will see later that this self-locating knowl-
edge gives a second form of entropy, namely the subjec-
tive entropy. An entropic equality is then derived, which
relates the second law to the acquisition of self-locating
knowledge. This equality bridges between the global and
local descriptions of an object. By accounting for the sub-
jective entropy, we show that change in entropy is in fact
a perspective change: either from the global description
to the local description, or from one local description to
another. Such perspective change is measured by flows
between different forms of entropy. We will find that the
formulation based on entropy transfer, instead of entropy
change, can well explain both the second law and the past
hypothesis.
The following sections are organized as follows. The
second section explains why von Neumann entropy can
be used when discussing the second law. It serves as
a pre-requisition, as in the following sections we will use
thermodynamic and von Neumann entropies interchange-
ably. The third and fourth sections examine a bipartite
object-environment system, and explains the necessity of
defining a subjective entropy with the help of the quan-
tum Szilard engine. The fifth section introduces an ex-
ternal observer and examines the entropic equality under
the tripartite object-environment-observer system. The
sixth and seventh sections show the validity of the equal-
ity under arbitrary system partition and general positive-
operator-valued measures (POVM). The eighth section
discusses the physical meaning of the mathematical for-
mulation and how it provides a unified explanation for
the second law and the past hypothesis.
II. THERMODYNAMIC ENTROPY AND VON
NEUMANN ENTROPY
There is a common confusion on the notion of von Neu-
mann entropy and whether it is applicable to thermody-
namics. Sometimes von Neumann entropy is referred as
the “fine-grained” entropy, in contrast to the “coarse-
grained” thermodynamic entropy [15]. This, however,
regards von Neumann entropy as the entropy that mea-
sures the uncertainty of the global description, which is
only one of its use cases. In fact, when discussing the
fine-grained entropy, we regard ourselves as “ideal ob-
servers” that are not entangled with the object. Besides,
the object does not interact with its environment, and
is regarded as an isolated quantum system. The global
state of this object then follows the Liouville-von Neu-
mann equation which gives a constant von Neumann en-
tropy [16]. In this case, no thermodynamic irreversibility
arises.
In reality, the object interacts with its environment
and the observer, and is no longer an isolated system.
We may instead use von Neumann entropy to measure
the uncertainty of its local description. This gives rise
to thermodynamic irreversibility. In practice, we may
reduce the global description to local descriptions with
two operations: conditioning on the observation (which
corresponds to quantum mechanical measurement) and
partial-tracing over the environment (which corresponds
to decoherence). We will see in the following section that
the latter operation arises from the former by averaging
over all branches. Both operations are quantum mechan-
ical counterparts of the classical coarse-graining proce-
dure.
Consider a simple example in which an isolated box
contains two distinguishable particles labeled 1 and 2 (see
Fig. 1). The box has two rooms labeled L (left) and R
(right), separated by an opaque wall. The state of each
particle lives in a two-dimensional Hilbert space spanned
by orthonormal states |L〉i and |R〉i (i = 1, 2). We as-
sume the box does not interact with the particles, and
the wall denoted by W only interacts with the particle(s)
on its left side. The state of W is therefore denoted by
the particle(s) in the left room: |n〉W (none), |1〉W , |2〉W ,
|b〉W (both), or their superposition. An external observer
with label O is watching the box from its left side. Due to
the opaque wall, the observer can only see inside the left
room. Her state is either |e〉O (seeing an empty room),
|f〉O (seeing a non-empty room), or their superposition.
Now suppose the entire system is in a super-
posed state of
(
a1|L〉1|L〉2|b〉W + a2|L〉1|R〉2|1〉W +
a3|R〉1|L〉2|2〉W
)
|f〉O+a4|R〉1|R〉2|n〉W |e〉O where ai (i =
1, · · · , 4) are coefficients that satisfy the normalization
condition
∑4
i=1 |ai|2 = 1. If we would like to use the
von Neumann entropy formula to calculate the thermo-
dynamic entropy, we need to first condition on the ob-
servation so that the description is local. If the observer
sees an empty room, she is in the branch in which the
particles and the box are in the state |R〉1|R〉2|n〉W . If
instead she sees a non-empty room, then she is in the
branch in which the particle-box subsystem is in a su-
perposed state of (ignoring any normalization factor)
a1|L〉1|L〉2|b〉W + a2|L〉1|R〉2|1〉W + a3|R〉1|L〉2|2〉W .
Following the conditioning, we need to partial-trace
over the wall, for the entropy we consider measures the
uncertainty of the particle states only. For example, in
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FIG. 1. A system consists of a box, an opaque wall, an ob-
server, and two distinguishable particles labeled 1 and 2.
the branch where the observer sees a non-empty room,
partial-tracing results in a mixed state of the particles,
described by a density matrix ρ = p1|L〉1〈L|1⊗|L〉2〈L|2+
p2|L〉1〈L|1⊗ |R〉2〈R|2 + p3|R〉1〈R|1⊗ |L〉2〈L|2 where the
probabilities pi = |ai|2/
∑3
j=1 |aj |2.
The von Neumann entropy of the particles in this
branch, after conditioning and partial-tracing, gives rise
to the Gibbs entropy formula:
−tr(ρ log ρ) = −p1 log p1 − p2 log p2 − p3 log p3 . (2)
We may compare Eq. 2, which gives a positive entropy,
with the other branch where the observer is in |e〉O, in
which the particles have zero entropy. According to the
second law, there is a macroscopic tendency for the ob-
server state to switch from |e〉O to |f〉O, but not the other
way around.
To see that Eq. 2 indeed gives the thermodynamic en-
tropy, we let the particles interact with the box, assuming
it is a thermal reservoir at a constant inverse tempera-
ture β. For simplicity, we also assume each particle has
only two energy states, either 0 or ε > 0, and the wall
acts as a selectively permeable membrane such that par-
ticle(s) are on its left side if and only if they have zero
energy. Due to the symmetry between the two particles,
the probabilities in the density matrix follow p2 = p3.
We define p := p2 = p3 and q := p1 = 1 − 2p. Assum-
ing the whole system is in thermal equilibrium, we have
q = p exp(βε) according to the Boltzmann distribution.
We may then derive the fundamental thermodynamic re-
lation from the internal energy formula U = 2pε and the
entropy formula (Eq. 2) S = −2p log p− q log q:
dS = −(log q + 1)dq − 2(log p+ 1)dp
= log(p/q)d(−2p) = 2βεdp = βdU .
(3)
This shows that S as given by Eq. 2 is indeed the ther-
modynamic entropy.
In general, consider an arbitrary system that is de-
composed into an object, an external observer, and the
rest as the environment. Suppose the whole tripartite
system is in a pure state |Φ〉 ∈ H ⊗ He ⊗ Hs where H,
He, and Hs denote the respective Hilbert spaces of the
object (e.g. particles), the environment (e.g. wall/box),
and the observer. These Hilbert spaces (assumed being
finite-dimensional) have dimensions of n, ne, and ns, re-
spectively. With the help of Schmidt decomposition [17],
|Φ〉 can be expressed by (assuming nne ≥ ns as the en-
vironment usually has a much larger number of degrees




ai|φi〉 ⊗ |si〉 , (4)
where |si〉 (i = 1, 2, · · · , ns) form an orthonormal basis of
Hs, and the corresponding |φi〉 are orthonormal states in
H⊗He. We may regard them as states that the observer
can perceive. This is consistent with quantum Darwin-
ism, which claims that pointer states correspond to those
that can leave numerous copies in the environment and
are therefore determined by the unique Schmidt decom-
position [18].
In each of the ns branches, the observer perceives ob-
servation outcomes predefined by the corresponding ob-
server state |si〉. We may condition on the observation
outcomes, such that the object-environment subsystem
is in the corresponding local state |φi〉. This state may








j 〉 ⊗ |ψ
(i)
j 〉e , (5)
where |ψ(i)j 〉 ∈ H and |ψ
(i)
j 〉e ∈ He (j = 1, · · · , n) are
orthonormal states of the object and the environment,
respectively. Note that they are, in general, different
across different branches. Partial-tracing |φi〉〈φi| over















j |2 is the conditional probability of the
object being in a microstate |ψ(i)j 〉, as perceived by the
observer in |si〉. The von Neumann entropy formula then













III. QUANTUM SZILARD ENGINE
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that
the density matrix after conditioning and partial-tracing
gives rise to the ordinary thermodynamic entropy via the
von Neumann entropy formula. Now we would like to
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define a new form of entropy that is consistent with Ev-
erettian quantum mechanics. As illustrated in [7, 19],
thermodynamic entropy changes in opposite directions
when an object interacts with its environment (entropy
increases) or with an observer (entropy on average de-
creases). Such perspective dependence makes the ap-
plication of entropic descriptions less ubiquitous. Sup-
pose we divide a system into two, an object and the rest
part. It is preferable to use physical descriptions that
are perspective-free, irrespective of the second part being
either a sentient observer (or a subject) or some physical
environment without sentience.
The preference of using a perspective-free description
is consistent with Everettian quantum mechanics, which
treats objects and subjects on an equal footing. The
object and subject may be entangled in a way such that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between definite ob-
ject states and subject states, e.g. |↑〉 corresponding to
|perceiving ↑〉 and | ↓〉 corresponding to |perceiving ↓〉.
In this sense, the object-subject pair undergoes apparent
branching such that the subject in each branch perceives
a definite object state, a “relative state” with respect
to a particular subject state as formulated in Everett’s
original paper [8]. Equivalently, we could also claim that
this subject state is a “relative state” with respect to
the corresponding object state. The perspective-free de-
scriptions, e.g. the density matrix (|↑〉〈↑| ⊗ |perceiving ↑
〉〈perceiving ↑|+ |↓〉〈↓|⊗ |perceiving ↓〉〈perceiving ↓|)/2,
are arguably symmetric if we switch the roles of the ob-
ject and the subject. In accordance with this feature of
Everett’s interpretation, physical descriptions should be
equally applicable to any physical system, regardless of
whether it contains a sentient observer. We will therefore
consider the bipartite system as if it is composed of an
object and the rest part being a sentient observer. The
results should hold as well for physical systems without
sentience.
When the object is entangled with the sentient ob-
server, the observer experiences a local reality that differs
from the global reality. It suggests that only knowing the
global reality is insufficient, for the observer also knows
in which branch she actually lives (referred as her self-
locating knowledge) when recognizing the local reality.
One way to interpret this is the self-locating knowledge
effectively “localizes” the global reality to the local re-
ality. Note that it is not only insufficient but also un-
necessary to know the global reality [19]. To know the
object state in the observer’s own branch, the way in
which different branches combine (e.g. phase factor of
each branch) needs not come into the picture. Accord-
ingly, a complete description of the object should consist
of both a coarse-grained description of the object (ob-
tained by partial-tracing over the rest of the system) and
the self-locating knowledge acquired by the observer. We
will show that the two parts give rise to two correspond-
ing forms of entropy.
Before defining the two forms of entropy, we may fur-
ther illustrate the self-locating knowledge with the help
of the quantum Szilard engine, a quantum-mechanical re-
alization of Maxwell’s demon [20, 21]. The quantum Szi-
lard engine may be illustrated by the isolated box shown
in Fig. 1 (now assume the wall separating the left and
the right rooms is movable). The observer perceives ei-
ther an empty or a non-empty left room. Provided that
the left room is empty, she will attach a load to the wall
and let the right room expand. This extracts work from
the engine (see Fig. 2 for an illustration of the process).
Essentially, the observer utilizes her self-locating knowl-
edge to extract work, in analogy with Maxwell’s demon.
This shows that self-locating knowledge is physical in the
sense that it exerts impact on the physical world.
FIG. 2. Illustrative graph of the quantum Szilard engine.
We will analyze the quantum Szilard engine illustrated
in Fig. 2. Suppose the box is a thermal reservoir at in-
verse temperature β, and particles on the left and the
right sides of the wall are at the respective energy lev-
els of 0 and ε  1/β. Note that the two uneven energy
levels may be achieved by an uneven partition, such that
particles on the right side are initially confined in an ex-
tremely small room. The observer finds herself perceiving
either an empty left room with probability p ≈ e−2βε, or
a non-empty room with probability 1 − p ≈ 1. Such
self-locating knowledge carries a Shannon information
entropy of approximately −p ln p ≈ 2βεe−2βε. In a sin-
gle cycle, the quantum Szilard engine can, on average,
extract p · 2ε ≈ 2εe−2βε amount of work. This equals the
Shannon entropy of the self-locating knowledge, multi-
plying a temperature coefficient 1/β (see [20] for a com-
pletely general analysis).
Note that the sentient observer is not essential for ex-
tracting work. All we need is an automated device that
attaches a load to the wall if and only if the wall is in the
state |n〉W (i.e. none of the particles are on its left side).
This again implies that self-locating knowledge is phys-
ical, in the sense that it does not require sentience. It
is therefore reasonable to talk about self-locating knowl-
edge “acquired by” the environment of an object, even
if it is not a sentient observer. In the following section,
we will use the two terms “object” and “environment” to
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denote the two parts of a bipartite system, regardless of
their properties related to sentience.
IV. BIPARTITE SYSTEM
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that the
complete description of an object consists of a coarse-
grained description of the object alone, plus the self-
locating knowledge acquired by its environment. We may
assign one entropy to measure the uncertainty of the for-
mer, namely the objective entropy, and assign another
to measure the information carried by the latter, namely
the subjective entropy.
We have demonstrated in Sec. II that the von Neu-
mann entropy gives rise to the coarse-grained thermody-
namic entropy (see Eq. 2). This implies that the objective
entropy, which measures the uncertainty of the coarse-
grained object state, takes the form of the von Neumann
entropy formula
Sobjective = −tr (ρ log ρ) , (8)
where the density matrix ρ represents the coarse-grained
object state, obtained by partial-tracing the state of the
entire system over the environment.
In the previous example of the quantum Szilard engine
(Fig. 2), we have shown that the average work performed
by the engine is proportional to the Shannon entropy of
the self-locating knowledge. It therefore makes sense to
express the subjective entropy by the (negative) Shannon




pk log pk , (9)
where pk denotes the probability of the k-th branch and
the summation is over all branches. Note that Eq. 9
only applies when the local state of the object is pure
in each branch. In Sec. VI, we will generalize it to cases
with mixed local states by replacing the Shannon entropy
with the quantum relative entropy [22].
We may illustrate the objective and subjective entropies
with a simple example. Consider an object (e.g. an elec-
tron) initially in a pure state, represented by a state
vector (|↑〉 + |↓〉)/
√
2 or equivalently a density matrix
(| ↑〉〈↑ | + | ↑〉〈↓ | + | ↓〉〈↑ | + | ↓〉〈↓ |)/2. In the process
of decoherence, the object interacts with its environment
ε and branches. Together they form an entangled state
(| ↑, ε↑〉 + | ↓, ε↓〉)/
√
2. By partial-tracing over ε, we end
up with a density matrix with off-diagonal elements re-
moved: (|↑〉〈↑ | + |↓〉〈↓ |)/2. The objective entropy given
by Eq. 9 increases from 0 before decoherence to 1 bit after
decoherence, This gives an appearance that decoherence
causes 1 bit of information loss.
But actually the 1 bit of information is now encoded in
the self-locating knowledge instead of being lost forever.
After decoherence, both branches (i.e. |↑〉〈↑| and |↓〉〈↓|)
have 50% probabilities. According to Eq. 9, the subjec-
tive entropy decreases from 0 to -1 bit, compensating
the increase in the objective entropy exactly. Therefore,
rather than claiming entropy increases as a result of de-
coherence, we may instead state that entropy transfers
between two alternative forms.
To understand the physical meaning of the statement,
consider the environment asking “In which branch am
I living?” The answer to this question gives the self-
locating knowledge. Before recognizing the answer, the
best estimation of the object state is the indeterminis-
tic global state, 50% |↑〉 and 50% |↓〉. After recognizing
the self-locating knowledge, however, the environment is
capable of reducing this indeterministic global state to a
deterministic local state: either 100% |↑〉 in the branch of
|ε↑〉, or 100% |↓〉 in the branch of |ε↓〉. This means that
the self-locating knowledge removes any uncertainty of
the global state, and therefore carries exactly 1 bit of in-
formation, which may be utilized by a quantum Szilard
engine to extract work.
In this example, the sum of the objective and sub-
jective entropies remains unchanged under decoherence.
Accordingly, we define the perspective-free entropy of an
object as the sum of the two entropies:
S = Sobjective + Ssubjective . (10)
S is perspective-free in the sense that it is invariant under
perspective changes. To illustrate this point, we will de-
fine the apparent entropy as the entropy perceived by the
observer, essentially equivalent to the concept of thermo-
dynamic entropy. In the example above, the apparent
entropy equals the objective entropy, which increases as
a result of decoherence. Despite the fact that the sub-
jective entropy decreases, it is not part of the apparent
entropy. This is because the subjective entropy measures
the self-locating knowledge acquired by the environment.
Any “ideal observer” outside the bipartite system is in-
capable of accessing it to reduce the uncertainty of the
global object state.
On the other hand, in the process of measurement the
apparent entropy decreases on average [19]. This is be-
cause the observer is now inside the system, thus no
longer an “ideal observer”. She acquires self-locating
knowledge during the measurement (this will be dis-
cussed in detail in the following section). As a result,
the apparent entropy not only includes the objective en-
tropy, but also a decreasing part of the subjective entropy.
We may interpret the apparent difference between de-
coherence and measurement as a perspective difference:
between a perspective outside the system and a perspec-
tive inside the system. Using the perspective-free en-
tropy makes the description independent of any specific
perspective, or in some sense the subject-object division.
This implies the perspective-free entropy is a conserved
quantity.
To show that perspective-free entropy is indeed con-
served under decoherence, we consider a general case in
which there exists an orthonormal basis {|oi〉} of the ob-
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ject, such that the object-environment interaction follows
the unitary transformation
|oi〉|ε∗〉 → |oi〉|εi〉 , (11)
where |ε∗〉 is the state of the environment prior to the in-
teraction, |oi〉 is a basis state of the object, and |εi〉 is the
corresponding final state of the environment. We assume
perfect decoherence in the sense that the final states of
the environment are orthogonal, i.e. 〈εi|εj〉 = 0 for all i
and j such that i 6= j. We define {|εi〉} as the “pointer ba-
sis” of the environment. The name comes from quantum
Darwinism, which claims that pointer states are those
that can be cloned to the environment without being
changed [18]. This means that pointer states need to
satisfy Eq. 11.
We will analyze decoherence using the language of
density matrix. In the following context, we use the
function S(·) to denote either von Neumann or Shan-
non entropy: if it takes a density matrix as its argument,
then it denotes von Neumann entropy; if it takes a set
of probabilities as its argument, then it denotes Shan-
non entropy. Now consider the case in which the object
is originally in a pure state ρ, such that the von Neu-
mann entropy S(ρ) = 0. According to Eqs. 8 and 9,
Sobjective = Ssubjective = 0.
After decoherence, the bipartite system branches.
Each branch, defined by a “pointer basis” state |εk〉,
corresponds to a density matrix ρ(k) = |ok〉〈ok| ac-
cording to Eq. 11. In other words, conditioning to
|εk〉 gives the local object state ρ(k). The coarse-
grained density matrix defined by partial-tracing, ρ̃ :=
trε (
∑
k pk|ok〉〈ok| ⊗ |εk〉〈εk|), equals the average of ρ(k)
over all branches, i.e. ρ̃ = E[ρ(k)] (this illustrates how
decoherence removes off-diagonal elements, for each ρ(k)
only contains a diagonal element). Note that the proba-
bility pk is given by 〈ok|ρ|ok〉.
Due to the purity of the local state ρ(k) the von Neu-
mann entropy S(ρ̃) = −tr(ρ̃ log ρ̃) equals the classical
Shannon entropy S({pk}) = −
∑
k pk log pk. According
to Eqs. 8 and 9, Sobjective and Ssubjective compensates
each other exactly. This means that the self-locating
knowledge removes any uncertainty in the coarse-grained
description of the object.
In summary, under perfect decoherence Sobjective in-
creases from 0 to S({pk}) while Ssubjective decreases
from 0 to −S({pk}). Their summation, defined as the
perspective-free entropy, is conserved (see Tab. I). Deco-
herence therefore leads to a transfer (rather than a net
increase) of entropy between two forms, interpreted as a
process in which the environment acquires self-locating
knowledge (rather than a process in which the informa-
tion gets lost forever).
V. TRIPARTITE SYSTEM
By dividing a system into an object and the remain-
ing part (referred as the “environment” in the previous
TABLE I. Entropies of an object in a bipartite system (as-
suming perfect decoherence). The perspective-free entropy is
conserved under decoherence.
Entropy Objective Subjective Perspective-free
Before decoherence 0 0 0
After decoherence S({pk}) −S({pk}) 0
section), we have shown that perspective-free entropy is
conserved under decoherence. However, to describe a re-
alistic measurement process, one needs to further divide
this remaining part to leave some room for an observer.
That is, the system we consider should include explicitly
both the environment and the observer, thus an object-
environment-observer tripartite system. We assume the
entire system is always in pure states and consider a mea-
surement conducted by the observer.
Before the measurement, the object being measured
is in a mixed state, represented by a density matrix
ρ =
∑
i |oi〉pi〈oi|. We further assume that the object-
environment subsystem is in a pure state. It can then be
considered as the bipartite system discussed in the previ-
ous section, in which the objective entropy S(ρ) is offset
by a subjective entropy −S(ρ) measuring the self-locating
knowledge acquired by the environment.
After the measurement, the observer is entangled with
the object, and acquires self-locating knowledge which
determines the local state of the object. In entropic
terms, the apparent entropy perceived by the observer
now incorporates a non-zero part of the subjective en-
tropy, and therefore decreases after the measurement [19].
To explain this entropy decrease, we need to divide the
subjective entropy into two parts, one of which measures
the self-locating knowledge acquired by the observer and
the other measures the self-locating knowledge of the en-
vironment. Eq. 10 is therefore modified to





where the second and third terms on the right-hand side
denote the subjective entropy of the observer and the sub-
jective entropy of the environment, respectively. Their
summation equals the total subjective entropy Ssubjective
as given in Eq. 10.
Similar to Eq. 11, the process of measurement follows
an unitary transformation
|õk〉|s∗〉 → |õk〉|sk〉 , (13)
where {|õk〉} is a basis of the object. |s∗〉 and |sk〉 are
observer states before and after the measurement. We as-
sume |sk〉 is a state that can be directly perceived. This
essentially means that the corresponding object state |õk〉
is a pointer state. We therefore define {|sk〉} as the
“pointer basis” of the observer. We will keep this as-
sumption throughout the rest of this section, and relax
it in the following sections.
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In practice, the partition of the system is somewhat
arbitrary. We may regard it as a factorization of the en-
tire Hilbert space: Htotal = H⊗He⊗Hs. Its logarithmic
dimension log ntotal is defined as the number of total de-
grees of freedom. Among these degrees of freedom we
find out log n (assuming n  ntotal) degrees of freedom
which are responsible for the observer’s direct percep-
tion. These degrees of freedom are used to construct
the observer Hilbert space Hs, spanned by the “pointer
basis” |sk〉 (k = 1, · · · , n). We then find out the n corre-
sponding states |õk〉 (k = 1, · · · , n) according to Eq. 13,
which span the object Hilbert space H. The remaining
log ntotal − 2 log n degrees of freedom are recognized as
the environment degrees of freedom for constructing the
environment Hilbert space He.
Under such system partition, there is a one-to-one cor-
respondence between the n observer states, |sk〉, and the
n object states, |õk〉, where k = 1, · · · , n. We will see
that after the measurement, the observer in one of these
“pointer basis” states, |sk〉, is certain that the object is in
the corresponding pure state, |õk〉. Therefore, the mea-
surement results in the apparent entropy of the object
decreasing from S(ρ) to 0.
Before the measurement, the object-environment sub-
system is in a pure state, which can be written as∑
i ai|εi〉|oi〉. This gives the object state ρ =
∑
i |oi〉pi〈oi|
where pi = |ai|2. It is noted that the branching of the ob-
ject state is determined by the “pointer basis”, {|εi〉}, of
the environment (plus the unitary transformation of the
object-environment interaction, Eq. 11). After the mea-
surement, the object-environment subsystem gets entan-
gled with the observer. We may write the unitary trans-














According to Eq. 14, the observer living in the k-th
branch, defined by the observer state |sk〉, perceives a
pure state |õk〉 and concludes that the object has a
zero apparent entropy. In the language of density ma-
trix, the local state of the object may be expressed by
ρ(k) = |õk〉〈õk|.
The self-locating probability of the observer being in




|ai|2|〈õk|oi〉|2 = 〈õk| ρ |õk〉 . (15)
Partial-tracing Eq. 14 over both the observer and the
environment gives the coarse-grained global state ρ̃ :=∑
k |õk〉p̃k〈õk|. According to Eq. 8, the objective entropy
changes from S(ρ) before the measurement to S(ρ̃) =
S({p̃k}) after the measurement.
Before the measurement, the subjective entropy of the
observer is zero, as she acquires no self-locating knowl-
edge. After the measurement, the subjective entropy of
the observer decreases to
∑
k p̃k log p̃k = −S({p̃k}) ac-
cording to Eq. 9. This decrease compensates the increase
in the objective entropy more than enough. The appar-
ent entropy, which equals the sum of the objective entropy
and the subjective entropy of the observer, drops to zero,
suggesting the observer acquires sufficient self-locating
knowledge to remove any uncertainty in the global de-
scription of the object. See Tab. II for the entropies be-
fore and after the measurement.
In the process of measurement, the branching of the
object state switches from being determined by the
“pointer basis” of the environment, {|εi〉}, to being de-
termined by the “pointer basis” of the observer, {|sk〉}.
Knowing the observer state |sk〉 is now sufficient to re-
duce the global mixed state ρ̃ to a local pure state ρ(k).
Further acquiring the self-locating knowledge of the envi-
ronment would not deepen the observer’s understanding
of the object. In entropic terms, the subjective entropy
of the environment increases from −S(ρ) back to 0. This
change is in the opposite direction compared to the sub-
jective entropy of the observer, which decreases from 0
to −S(ρ̃). One may interpret this as the observer com-
peting against the environment in order to acquire more
self-locating knowledge (or equivalently to lower her sub-
jective entropy). As a result, the previous branches de-
fined by the environment are completely overridden, il-
lustrated in Fig. 3(a), by the new branches.
TABLE II. Entropies of an object in a tripartite system (assuming measurement leads to a final state |sk〉 which belongs to the
“pointer basis” of the observer). The perspective-free entropy is conserved under measurement. Note that the apparent entropy
from the observer’s perspective accounts for both the objective entropy and the subjective entropy of the observer.
Entropy Objective Subjective
(observer)





Before measurement S(ρ) 0 S(ρ) −S(ρ) 0
After measurement S({p̃k}) −S({p̃k}) 0 0 0
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FIG. 3. (a) The previous branches, determined by the “pointer basis” of the environment, are completely overridden by the new
branches, determined by the “pointer basis” of the observer, in a process described by Eq. 14. (b) The previous branches are
partially overridden by the new branches in a process described by Eq. 16. The row indices are “pointer basis” states, |εi〉, of
the environment, the column indices are “pointer basis” states, |sk〉, of the observer, and the table cells give the corresponding
local states of the object.
As an implication, we may regard decoherence and
measurement as two reciprocal processes: decoherence
from the perspective of the observer is measurement from
the perspective of the environment, and vice versa. In
entropic terms, decoherence and measurement transfer
subjective entropy between the two components, the ob-
server and the environment, in opposite directions. From
the perspective of the observer, she can utilize her self-
locating knowledge to determine the local object state,
thus perceiving an apparent entropy that includes both
the objective entropy and the subjective entropy of the
observer (see the black solid circle in Fig. 4).
In Fig. 4, since measurement transfers subjective en-
tropy out (from the observer to the environment), the
apparent entropy decreases. On the other hand, in the
process of decoherence, subjective entropy flows in the
opposite direction. This is illustrated in the previous
section, where conditioning to an environment state |εi〉
results in a pure object state |oi〉 after decoherence. This
implies the negative subjective entropy of the environ-
ment fully offsets the positive objective entropy, leaving
a zero subjective entropy of the observer. As a result,
decoherence transfers subjective entropy from the envi-
FIG. 4. Transfers between different forms of entropy in the
processes of decoherence and measurement. The black solid
circle indicates the apparent entropy from the perspective of
the observer. The red dotted circle indicates the apparent
entropy from the perspective of the environment.
ronment to the observer, thus increasing the apparent
entropy.
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We may change the definition of the apparent entropy
by switching our perspective. If our perspective is in-
stead from the environment side, then the apparent en-
tropy includes the subjective entropy of the environment
instead of the observer. Measurement, which transfers
subjective entropy from the observer to the environment,
now increases the apparent entropy. Decoherence, which
transfers subjective entropy in the opposite direction, now
decreases the apparent entropy. This provides an entropic
characterization of the reciprocity between decoherence
and measurement. We will therefore only focus on the
process of measurement when discussing the general re-
sults in Sec. VI and VII. For the process of decoherence,
the same results apply if we switch the roles of the envi-
ronment and the observer.
VI. GENERAL RESULT
In this section, we will relax the assumption that mea-
surement leads to a final state which belongs to the
“pointer basis” of the observer as illustrated by Eq. 13.
Instead we consider a general measurement which follows
the unitary transformation |õk〉|s∗〉 → |õk〉|σk〉, where the
final state, |σk〉, is now different from the “pointer basis”
state, |sk〉, that can be directly perceived by the observer.










After the measurement, in the k-th branch (where the
observer finds herself perceiving |sk〉), the local state of
the object-environment subsystem is an entangled state∑
i,j ai〈õj |oi〉〈sk|σj〉|εi〉|õj〉 (ignoring any normalization
factor).
By partial-tracing over the environment, we find that
in the k-th branch, the object is generally in a mixed













〈õj2 | , (17)
where ρ =
∑
i |ai|2|oi〉〈oi| is the density matrix of the
object before the measurement. The normalization factor
p̃k is given by the (self-locating) probability of the k-th
branch: p̃k =
∑
j〈õj |ρ|õj〉|〈sk|σj〉|2. Eq. 17 is called the
quantum-mechanical Bayes’ theorem [7].
It is noted that in this general case, the observer can
no longer use her self-locating knowledge to reduce the
object state to a pure state. In other words, the previ-
ous branches, determined by the “pointer basis” of the
environment {|εi〉}, are now only partially overridden by
the new branches, determined by the “pointer basis” of
the observer {|sk〉}. This is different from the special
result derived in the previous section. The difference is
visualised in Fig. 3. The result in the previous section,
illustrated in Fig. 3(a), associates different environment
states with completely identical object states. Knowing
which observer state is perceived (e.g. |s1〉) is sufficient to
determine a pure state of the object (e.g. |õ1〉). There-
fore, the self-locating knowledge of the environment is
redundant, measured by a zero subjective entropy of the
environment (see Table II).
In contrast, in this general case different environment
states are no longer associated with identical object
states, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b). Consider the branch
in which the observer perceives |sk〉. The local state of
the object is now a statistical ensemble, represented by
the density matrix ρ(k). This mixed state could be “pu-
rified” by further utilizing the self-locating knowledge of
the environment. For instance, by knowing that the en-
vironment is actually in |εi〉, one may reduce the mixed
state ρ(k) to a pure state
∑
j ai〈õj |oi〉〈sk|σj〉|õj〉. We can
see that the self-locating knowledge of the environment is
no longer redundant, measured by a negative subjective
entropy of the environment.
The quantum-mechanical Bayes’ theorem, Eq. 17, is
a special case of the positive-operator-valued measure
(POVM). In POVM, the measurement outcomes take
values from a set of positive semi-definite Hermitian op-
erators {Fk}, where
∑
k Fk equals the identity opera-
tor, and the probability of the k-th outcome is given
by p̃k = tr(ρFk) [22]. These operators take the form
Fk =
∑
j |õj〉|〈sk|σj〉|2〈õj | in the special case of the
quantum-mechanical Bayes’ theorem. In the remaining
part of the section, we will demonstrate the conservation
of perspective-free entropy under general POVM.
In fact, each positive semi-definite Hermitian Fk
has a decomposition Fk = M
†
kMk such that the
post-measurement object state is given by ρ(k) =
MkρM
†
k / p̃k. Note that this immediately gives the
quantum-mechanical Bayes’ theorem, Eq. 17, if we as-
sign Mk =
∑
j |õj〉〈sk|σj〉〈õj |. Now suppose the observer
ignores any self-locating knowledge (i.e. an “ideal ob-
server”). Then she could only describe the object by the




ingly, the objective entropy changes from S(ρ) to S(ρ̃)
under the measurement.
A realistic observer, however, acquires self-locating
knowledge after the measurement, which can be uti-
lized to determine the local object state. In the k-
th branch, the information gain of recognizing the self-
locating knowledge is measured by her subjective entropy
decreasing from 0 before the measurement to −S(ρ(k)|| ρ̃)
after the measurement. Here the quantum-mechanical














The non-negativity of the quantum relative entropy fol-
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lows from Klein’s inequality [23]. This guarantees the
subjective entropy −S(ρ(k)|| ρ̃) to be non-positive, con-
sistent with the fact that self-locating knowledge always
carries an information gain.
From the information-theoretic point of view, the use
of the quantum relative entropy illustrates an informa-
tion updating procedure. In the absence of self-locating
knowledge, the observer can at best estimate the object
state by the coarse-grained density matrix ρ̃ (which is
predictable using the object state before the measure-
ment). After realizing she actually lives in the k-th
branch, the observer immediately updates her estimate
to ρ(k). Note that this information update needs not
to be realized by a physical process. In fact, after the
measurement the observer experiences only a local real-
ity, which implicitly involves updating the object state
to the local state.
The information gain inherent to this updating pro-
cedure is measured by the relative entropy S(ρ(k) || ρ̃).
It therefore provides a proper measure of the subjective
entropy. Alternatively, one may interpret it by the quan-
tum Szilard engine: the average work performed by the
engine is given by the relative entropy of the distributions
between forward and backward processes [20, 24]. Sup-
pose after each operation the engine is decohered from
the observer and its local state is identical to the global
state. Then the engine has local states ρ(k) and ρ̃ be-
fore and after the operation, thus capable of extracting
S(ρ(k) || ρ̃) / β amount of work.
































It is noted that the subjective entropy formula, Eq. 9,
used in previous sections is a special case of Eq. 19. It
holds only when ρ(k) is pure for all k. In such cases, the
second term on the right-hand side of Eq. 19 is zero, while
the first term equals the Shannon entropy, i.e. S(ρ̃) =
S({p̃k}). This immediately leads to Eq. 9.
Now let’s discuss the subjective entropy of the environ-
ment after the measurement. By applying the projection
operator |sk〉〈sk| to the global state of the entire system,
we may find out the local state of the object-environment
subsystem in the k-th branch. Since the entire system is
in a pure state, the projected state is also pure, in con-
trast to the mixed state ρ(k) of the object alone. This
suggests that the self-locating knowledge of the environ-
ment can be used to “purify” the object state ρ(k). By
calculating the information gain (measured by the quan-
tum relative entropy) of updating ρ(k) to a pure state, one
immediately concludes that the subjective entropy of the
environment equals −S(ρ(k)) in the k-th branch. The av-
erage subjective entropy of the environment is then given
by −E[S(ρ(k))].
Table III summarizes the objective and subjective en-
tropies involved before and after the measurement. We
may verify our results by evaluating the apparent en-
tropy, which equals the sum of the objective entropy and
the subjective entropy of the observer:
Sobjective + S
(observer)













The calculated apparent entropy equals exactly the en-
tropy of the local state, ρ(k), as perceived by the observer,
averaged over all branches indexed by k. This equality
validates the values of the objective and subjective en-
tropies listed in Table III.
In summary, when performing a general POVM, the
observer acquires self-locating knowledge. This is mea-
sured by her subjective entropy decreasing from 0 to
−S(ρ(k) || ρ̃) in the k-th branch. On average, the de-
crease in subjective entropy compensates the increase in
objective entropy more than enough. As a result, the
observer is expected to perceive a decreasing apparent
entropy [19]. For the environment component of the
system, its subjective entropy increases from −S(ρ) to
−E[S(ρ(k))]. This may be interpreted as the measure-
ment resulting in new branches, which makes the pre-
vious branches less relevant as illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
In other words, the measurement decorrelates the object
states and the environment states, recording an average
increase in the subjective entropy of the environment.
VII. WIGNER’S MANY FRIENDS
We have shown that the perspective-free entropy is con-
served under general POVM and in both bipartite and
tripartite systems. In this section, we will generalize
this result for systems with an arbitrary number of com-
ponents. This generalization is inspired by the famous
Wigner’s friend thought experiment [25].
Here we consider a group of Wigner’s friends labeled
by their degrees of separation. For example, a first order
friend is a friend of Wigner, and a second order friend is
a friend of Wigner’s friend, etc. Now suppose Wigner is
watching all these friends performing a measurement in
a nested laboratory (see Fig. 5). In this laboratory, the
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TABLE III. Entropies of an object in a tripartite system (assuming general POVM). The perspective-free entropy is again
conserved in this general case. Note that the standard version of the second law assumes that the observer is agnostic about
self-locating knowledge and only accounts for the coarse-grained objective entropy, which increases from S(ρ) to S(ρ̃). If the
observer is aware of the self-locating knowledge, then the apparent entropy also needs to account for her subjective entropy. As a
result, a measurement performed by the observer leads to the apparent entropy decreasing on average, from S(ρ) to E[S(ρ(k))].
Entropy Objective Subjective
(observer)





Before measurement S(ρ) 0 S(ρ) −S(ρ) 0















i-th order friends get together to watch the j-th order
(j = i+1, i+2, · · · , N) friends collectively performing the
measurement. Such setup is iterative until the innermost
part of the laboratory, in which the N -th order friends
directly watch an apparatus (as part of the environment)
measuring a spin state (as the object).
FIG. 5. Illustrative graph of Wigner’s many friends.
In this thought experiment, the master observer,
Wigner, and the object together form a subsystem that
is in a mixed state after the measurement. Under gen-
eral POVM, Wigner has a self-locating probability pk0 of
living in the k0-th branch, which corresponds to one of
his “pointer basis” states |sk0〉0. In this branch, the lo-
cal state of the object is represented by a density matrix
ρ(k0). This contributes a term
pk0ρ
(k0) ⊗ |sk0〉0〈sk0 |0 (21)
to the density matrix of the object-Wigner subsystem.
Partial-tracing over Wigner gives the coarse-grained ob-




(k0), where the summation is over
all values of k0, i.e. the indices of Wigner’s “pointer ba-
sis” states.
Now if we include in this subsystem the first order
friends indexed by j, we get finer branches determined
by the product “pointer basis” states between Wigner
and his first order friends. Each of these product states,
denoted by |sk0〉0⊗ (⊗j |sk1〉1j), corresponds to an object
state ρ(k0k1) with a probability pk0k1 . This contributes
pk0k1ρ





to the density matrix of the subsystem consisting of the
object, Wigner, and his first order friends. After partial-
tracing this density matrix over the first order friends,
one should obtain the density matrix of the object-











In general, the object state perceived by Wigner and
his first i-th order friends collectively, who are in the
product state of |sk0〉0 ⊗ (⊗j |sk1〉1j) ⊗ · · · ⊗ (⊗j |ski〉ij),













Therefore, we can start from the object states ρ(k0k1···kN )
and iterate backwards to get the density matrix
ρ(k0k1···ki) for an arbitrary i.
We will describe this thought experiment using en-
tropic terms. First, Wigner in his “pointer basis” state
|sk0〉0 can utilize his self-locating knowledge to reduce the
global object state ρ̃ to a local state ρ(k0). On average,
this gives a subjective entropy of
S
(Wigner)
















Secondly, suppose Wigner and his first (i − 1)-th or-
der friends find themselves in a product state |sk0〉0 ⊗




. Together they will
describe the object using the density matrix ρ(k0···ki−1).
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Now if they could further access the self-locating knowl-
edge acquired by any of the i-th order friends, they would
immediately update the object state from ρ(k0···ki−1) to
ρ(k0···ki−1ki). Following the information-theoretic argu-
ments in the previous section, the subjective entropy of
the i-th order friends is given by the quantum relative
entropy −S(ρ(k0···ki−1ki) || ρ(k0···ki−1)). Using the proba-
bilities given by Eq. 24, we average it over all values of
















Finally, Wigner and all his friends together are in a
product state |sk0k1···kN 〉 := |sk0〉0 ⊗ (⊗j |sk1〉1j) ⊗ · · · ⊗
(⊗j |skN 〉Nj). Collectively they describe the object by
a local state ρ(k0···kN ). If in addition we account for the
self-locating knowledge of the environment (e.g. the mea-
suring apparatus), then we could further update ρ(k0···kN )
to ρ(k0···kNks), where |εks〉 denotes a “pointer basis” state
of the environment. Since we have now acquired all self-
locating knowledge about the object, we expect the new
local state ρ(k0···kNks) to be pure. This pure state can
be obtained simply by projecting the state vector of the
entire system to the product state |sk0k1···kN 〉 ⊗ |εks〉.
The self-locating knowledge of the environment con-
tributes an information gain S(ρ(k0···kNks) || ρ(k0···kN )).
Averaging over all values of ks gives the subjective en-































where the second equality holds due to the purity of
ρ(k0···kNks). The last equality follows from ρ(k0···kN ) =
Eks [ρ(k0···kNks)], which can be derived in the same way
as Eq. 24.
The total subjective entropy, accounting for Wigner
and all his friends as well as the environment, is given



































= −S (ρ̃) .
(29)
Recall that before the measurement, the objective and
subjective entropies are S(ρ) and −S(ρ), respectively (see
Table III). After the measurement, the coarse-grained
object state ρ̃ gives rise to an objective entropy of S(ρ̃),
and the total subjective entropy is −S(ρ̃) as shown in
Eq. 29. The perspective-free entropy defined in Eq. 10
is unchanged before and after the measurement. It is
noted that this thought experiment uses “friend” only as
a metaphor. In reality, the system partition needs not
to involve sentient beings. All it requires is a general
factorization of the entire Hilbert space. Therefore, the
thought experiment of Wigner’s many friends illustrates
the conservation of the perspective-free entropy in a quite
general setting.
VIII. SECOND LAW AND PAST HYPOTHESIS
A main result from the discussions above is the con-
servation of the perspective-free entropy S, defined as the
sum of the objective and subjective entropies:
∆S = 0 ⇔ ∆Sobjective = −∆Ssubjective . (30)
This equation is valid under general system partition and
POVM. For most practical applications, we split the sys-
tem into three components, namely the object, the envi-
ronment, and an external observer. In this case, the total
subjective entropy may be divided into the subjective en-
tropy of the environment and the subjective entropy of






From the perspective of the observer, the change in
apparent entropy is given by the left-hand side (LHS) of
Eq. 31. This includes the subjective entropy of the ob-
server, thus taking into account the fact that the observer
determines the local state of the object by utilizing her
self-locating knowledge. The right-hand side (RHS) of
Eq. 31 measures the decrease in the subjective entropy
of the environment. With the help of Eq. 31, despite
decoherence and measurement appearing to follow two
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separate laws as illustrated in [7, 19], they are indeed
two special cases of an unified law:
∆Ssubjective ≤ 0 when interacting with the object. (32)
Eq. 32 has a clear information-theoretic interpretation,
for one always acquires self-locating knowledge by inter-
acting with the object. If it is the observer who interacts
with the object, Eq. 32 applies to the observer, decreasing
the LHS of Eq. 31. As a result, the apparent entropy de-
creases after the object-observer interaction, correspond-
ing to the process of measurement. If, on the other hand,
it is the environment that interacts with the object, then
Eq. 32 applies to the environment, increasing the RHS
of Eq. 31. This results in an entropy increase after the
object-environment interaction, or the process of deco-
herence.
To make a detailed analysis of these changes in sub-
jective entropies, we first consider a measurement con-
ducted by the external observer. After the measure-
ment the observer becomes aware of the branch she in-








in the k-th branch, where pk
and ρ(k) are the self-locating probability and the local
state of the object, respectively. This negative subjective




(l) to the local state ρ(k). We can see
that Eq. 32 holds for interactions between an object and
an external observer.
The same logic applies when it is the environment that
interacts with the object. In the process of decoher-








in the k-th branch. In the case that
the object-environment composite is in a pure state, the
object state ρ(k), obtained via projection, is also pure.






















where ρ is the initial state of the object before decoher-
ence, and the inequality is proved in [7]. Note that ini-
tially the objective entropy and the subjective entropy of
the environment are S(ρ) and−S(ρ), respectively. Eq. 33
shows that the subjective entropy decreases on average,
validating Eq. 32 for interactions between an object and
its environment.
The most common version of the second law may
be regarded as a special case of Eq. 32, in which an
isolated system is divided into subsystems (which may
be achieved by an arbitrary factorization of the Hilbert
space). These subsystems interact with each other, and
therefore have decreasing subjective entropies according
to Eq. 32. This reflects the fact that they acquire self-
locating knowledge about each other (recall that self-
locating knowledge is completely physical and is realized
by quantum entanglement). An equivalent claim is that
they get more correlated with each other. To compensate
the decrease in subjective entropies, the objective entropy
increases. Given that we (as “ideal observers”) do not
access any self-locating knowledge acquired by these sub-
systems, we can only perceive an apparent entropy that
equals the increasing objective entropy. This explains the
entropy-increasing dynamics as claimed by the thermo-
dynamic second law.
One might argue that this thermodynamic irreversibil-
ity originates from the assumption that the subsystems
are initially uncorrelated. Suppose, on the other hand,
these subsystems are initially highly correlated. Then
they would probably get less correlated over time which
reverses our normal arrow of time, for the fundamental
laws of physics are time reversible. Therefore, it does
seem necessary to postulate an initial cosmological con-
dition with an extremely low entropy or correlation (the
past hypothesis).
It is indeed true that the thermodynamic irreversibility
is derived assuming a low-entropy (or equivalently weakly
correlated) initial condition. However, this assumption is
regarded as an observer effect rather than an ad hoc pos-
tulation. According to Eq. 32, every observation we make
results in a decrease in the subjective entropy and hence
the LHS of Eq. 31. This suggests that even though the
global state can have high entropy, the entropy of the local
state stays at a low level. In fact, the former ignores any
self-locating knowledge and hence excludes any subjective
entropy, while the latter includes a negative subjective
entropy measuring the self-locating knowledge acquired
via observation. This explains why we actually live in a
low-entropy world, even though high-entropy states are
much more likely. Since Eq. 32 explains both the entropy-
increasing dynamics and the low-entropy observation, it
provides a complete explanation for the past hypothe-
sis: an extremely low-entropy initial condition given by
extrapolating the current low-entropy local reality back-
wards in time.
We will explain in detail why the local states that we
observe are weakly correlated (or equivalently why our lo-
cal reality has low entropy). Consider the case in Sec. V
in which the object and the environment are initially
in a highly correlated state
∑
i ai|εi〉|oi〉. According to
Eq. 14, after the measurement, the state of the object-
environment subsystem, as perceived by the observer in
the “pointer basis” state |sk〉, is instead a simply sep-
arable state: (
∑
i ai〈õk|oi〉|εi〉) ⊗ |õk〉. This completely
decorrelates the object and the environment, measured
by a sufficient decrease in the subjective entropy of the
observer such that the LHS of Eq. 31 drops to zero. As
a result, the observer actually perceives a zero-entropy
state in which the object and the environment are com-
pletely uncorrelated.
As discussed in Sec. VI, a more general re-
sult follows from Eq. 16, in which the observer in
the “pointer basis” state |sk〉 perceives the object-




i,j ai〈õj |oi〉〈sk|σj〉|εi〉|õj〉. We use the entangle-
ment entropy to check if it is indeed a less correlated state
than the initial state
∑
i ai|εi〉|oi〉. By partial-tracing the
two states over the environment, we find the correspond-
ing density matrices of the object to be ρ(k) and ρ as
given in Eq. 17. Therefore, the entanglement entropy is
S (ρ) before the measurement and S(ρ(k)) after the mea-







≤ S(ρ) as proved in [19],
demonstrates that measurement indeed leads to a less
correlated state. In entropic terms, this is captured by
an increasing subjective entropy of the environment. Ac-
cording to Eq. 31, the observer perceives a local reality
with lower entropy.
As illustrated above, the second law is now fully ex-
plained by Eq. 32 instead of relying on some unexplained
initial condition. We therefore claim that Eq. 32 pro-
vides a complete and unified explanation of the second
law. One implication of Eq. 32 is that the thermo-
dynamic irreversibility may be regarded as a subjective
fact, and therefore a result of the subject-object division.
This does not imply anything non-physical or anything
that is free to change at will. It simply means the ir-
reversibility is related to subjective experience. In fact,
even though the fundamental laws of physics are com-
pletely reversible, we still experience irreversibility from
a particular perspective.
The second law, formulated by Eq. 32, thus reflects
a subjective or perceptual irreversibility. This provides
an alternative solution to Loschmidt’s paradox [26]: the
thermodynamic arrow of time derives from the subjective
arrow of time (while most literature work derives the lat-
ter from the former [27–29]). On the nature of time,
its reversibility illustrated in laws of physics is therefore
not contradictory to our everyday experience about its
directionality.
We noticed a similar explanation of the thermody-
namic second law proposed by Maccone [30]. It suggests
that entropy-increasing and entropy-decreasing processes
occur equally likely while only the former can be recorded.
This approach does not distinguish explicitly between
the global reality and the local reality. Instead it relies
on the fact that recording or memorizing mechanism re-
quires increase in correlation. It therefore concludes that
the second law is a mere tautology, as the memorizing
mechanism already presumes an arrow of time pointing
towards increasing correlation.
In contrast, the explanation proposed in the present
work distinguishes between the global reality and the lo-
cal reality. It suggests that while the global reality has
no directionality, the local reality is indeed directional.
Therefore, one is incapable of not only recording, but
also experiencing entropy-decreasing processes. In the
local reality, entropy-increasing and entropy-decreasing
processes are not equally likely. A vase breaking into
pieces is way more likely than these pieces forming a
brand new vase.
One implication of Eq. 32 is that measurement may
decrease the apparent entropy. This fact, which is re-
garded as a variation of the second law, is not covered by
Maccone’s approach. As a result, Maccone’s approach
does not explain why we see a low-entropy world while
high-entropy states are overwhelming. It is thus inca-
pable of providing a complete solution to Loschmidt’s
paradox [31]. On the other hand, the present work pro-
vides a plausible solution. It suggests a low-entropy local
state despite the high-entropy global state. This is due to
the acquisition of self-locating knowledge, measured by a
negative subjective entropy of the observer, which largely
offsets the positive objective entropy.
As a final comment, we would like to compare the low-
entropy initial singularity with the high-entropy black
hole singularity. The entropy of the initial singularity,
extrapolated from the current entropy of the universe,
appears to be extremely low compared to the black hole
entropy [32, 33]. As explained above, this low entropy
applies to the local reality. Since we are inside the sys-
tem, it accounts for the self-locating knowledge acquired
via our perception.
In contrast, a black hole singularity is protected by
a horizon, which separates us from the black hole inte-
rior. As a result, we are outside the system, incapable of
acquiring self-locating knowledge about the black hole in-
terior. In other words, the black hole degrees of freedom
can be regarded as something completely uncorrelated
with an external observer. From our perspective, they
form an isolated quantum system which evolves unitarily,
consistent with the “central dogma” [15]. Even if some
part of the black hole interior is entangled with Hawking
radiation, an external observer does not access the self-
locating knowledge acquired by the radiation. Therefore,
the subjective entropy of the observer is zero. The net re-
sult is a coarse-grained black hole entropy equaling one
fourth of its horizon area, which saturates the Bekenstein
bound [34].
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